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ABSTRACT: Prior research has found that depression affects how individuals recall self-
defining memories by preventing individuals from properly encoding and retrieving memories, 
resulting in a suspected inability to recall specific events and information (Conway, 1990). The 
current study aimed to replicate this finding and to examine whether this phenomenon exists 
within those with higher levels of anxiety, a concept not previously studied. Fifty-three 
participants were asked to recall two self-defining memories (Singer & Blagov, 2000) and forty-
seven participants described where they saw themselves two years from now in order to 
determine whether depression and anxiety affect future projections as well as memory recall. It 
was hypothesized that individuals who score higher on depression and anxiety inventories would 
respond to the self-defining memory task with generic or episodic memories more often than 
they would with a specific response, a hypothesis that was not supported, although memory type 
(pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple singe events, episodic, and 
generic) was predictive of scores on the BDI and BAI. It was also hypothesized that these 
individuals would write about their future using more negatively valenced words and shorter 
response lengths than would individuals who scored lower on these inventories, and it was found 
that valence, although not response length was predictive of scores on the BAI. These findings 
suggest that the self-defining memory task and self-defining future projections task may be a 
good indicator of high anxiety and depression as determined by the BAI and BDI and can be 
used as a tool to identify individuals for early intervention for anxiety and depression treatment.  
 Keywords: depression, anxiety, self-defining memories, self-defining future projections 
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The Effect of Anxiety and Depression on Self-Defining Memory and Self-Defining Future 
Projections 
Memory is an integral part of the human existence, and it is memory that guides everyday 
decisions and shapes one’s personality over time. As described in detail by Inglis (2014), the 
formation of a memory begins with one of the five memory pathways in the brain: semantic, 
episodic, procedural, automatic, and emotional. These pathways are involved in both the coding 
and storage of memories, as well as the retrieval of memories at a later date. The events that are 
associated with these memories determine which pathway to storage and retrieval the brain 
utilizes. Compared to the three other memory pathways, the episodic and emotional memory 
pathways are more crucial in self-defining memory as the result of their content. 
Episodic memories entail details concerning locations and circumstances surrounding 
events (Inglis, 2014). In other words, the setting of the memory is important during retrieval, just 
as when you walk into a room you are more apt to remember past events that have occurred 
there. Emotional memories have priority over the four other memory types, in the sense that 
emotionally toned memories can be linked to threats and therefore are more important for 
survival than other memory types (Inglis, 2014). Emotions play a strong role in the formation of 
memory and almost every memory has an emotion tied to it. For example, witnessing something 
traumatic, such as the passing of a relative in the hospital, can result in the memory of hospitals 
becoming linked to feelings of sadness and fear, and may even deter an individual from ever 
entering a hospital again. Even more interestingly, “if the emotional stimuli is [sic] too strong, 
the formation of factual memory can actually be blocked by neurochemicals” (Inglis, 2014, 
p.43), impacting an individual’s ability to store and retrieve accurate memories. Memories help 
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form our perception of the world, our actions and behaviors, beliefs, and our ability to make 
decisions. More importantly, memories, especially episodic and emotional memories, shape our 
personality and are strongly linked to our emotional states.  
 Not defined as one of the five major memory pathways, autobiographical memory is 
considered episodic memory, or more specifically, consists of consciously recalled episodic 
memories (Rubin, 2005; Tulving 1972; 1983). In fact, Philippe, Koestner, Beau-lieu-Pelletier, 
Lecours, and Lekes (2012) found that autobiographical memories are often linked to other types 
of memory, even ones with less importance to the self. It is this connection between these 
various memory types that makes up the memory network. However, autobiographical memories 
are more vivid than most memories, and in the act of recalling these memories, individuals feel 
as if they are reliving the event and can typically describe details and specifics, although these 
details may be unclear and inaccurately remembered (Brewer, 1999; Rubin, 1998). It is also 
important to note the emotional nature of these memories, as they often highly impact the 
choices an individual later makes and work to shape an individual into his or her present self. 
Rubin (2005) demonstrated that the amygdala, which is associated with emotion, and the 
hippocampus, associated with episodic memory, were more active during the retrieval of 
autobiographical memory than during the retrieval of semantic memory, highlighting the 
episodic and emotional nature of these memories. Conway proposed a definition of 
autobiographical memory when he stated: 
Autobiographical memory includes memories for specific experiences and memory for 
the personal facts of one’s life… Autobiographical memories for specific experiences 
represent interpretations of complex events, which are extended in time and may feature 
multiple actors and locations… Long-term collection of general features of the event, 
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interpretations, and some recall of a few specific details characterize the autobiographical 
memory of the experiment (Conway, 1990, pp. 4-5).  
Conway’s definition hints at the complexity of autobiographical memory and its importance in 
understanding complex events, which influence how we interpret and respond to similar events.  
 Conway’s definition of autobiographical memory comes years after autobiographical 
memory first became a focus of psychological research. Nearly a decade earlier, researchers such 
as Kolodner and Schank began theorizing about autobiographical memory (Kolodner, 1980; 
Schank, 1982), noting the importance of understanding earlier memories and how they, in turn, 
aid in understanding later events. An understanding and analysis of past events allows an 
individual to process events of a similar nature much faster and with better success (Barsalou, 
1988). Autobiographical memory is thought to have five main components: a) cueing, b) a search 
process, c) retrieval of a narrative, d) visual imagery, and e) affective components, similar to 
other memory models (Rubin, 1988). More specifically, autobiographical memory is impacted 
and shaped by individual senses (hearing, sight, and smell), spatial reasoning (location), 
emotions, narrative systems, which help understand relations between various objects, as well as 
a memory system which helps to organize and store the aforementioned stimuli and information 
(Rubin, 2005). The complexity and vast connection of autobiographical memory to various 
neurological processes exemplifies the importance of these memories in everyday life and the 
development of the self. It is clear that these memories are more than just basic knowledge or 
insignificant memories lost over time.  
 Autobiographical memory is complex and therefore cannot be understood in isolation. 
Autobiographical reasoning is the process in which individuals recall and analyze their 
autobiographical memories. Autobiographical reasoning allows an individual to relive an event, 
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and then use the consequences and lessons learned from that event to shape and guide decisions 
throughout daily life (Singer & Bluck, 2001). As a result, autobiographical memories play an 
important role in determining how an individual sees the world and interprets the events that 
occur in his or her life.   
Self-Defining Memories.  
The concept of autobiographical memory expanded over the years as research allowed 
experimenters to further understand the implications of these memories and how they work. 
More current research refers to these salient memories as “self-defining memories,” reflecting 
the importance of these memories to the self. Singer and Blagov (2000) published a classification 
manual concerning self-defining memories, in which explicit guidelines for self-defining 
memories were set forth. A self-defining memory is one which is (a) over one year old, (b) 
remembered very clearly and which has importance in both meaning and theme, (c) is linked to 
other similar memories, (d) invokes a feeling, and (e) has been thought about frequently, and 
thus is familiar to the individual. Singer and Blagov also created a classification system by which 
to score and code self-defining memories. Within this classification system, self-defining 
memories are more broadly organized as being specific or non-specific based on the content 
contained within them (Singer & Blagov, 2000). Specific memory narratives consist of a unique 
occurrence and are focused on an event that occurred within a single day. Within the specific 
memory classification, memories can be considered pure specific memories (the recalled 
memory consists only of single-event statements which are related to one another), a specific 
memory with generalization (a single-event statement which contains mentions of other events as 
well), and a specific memory with multiple single events (the recalled memory may consists of 
several specific memories or may also contain a specific memory as well as an episodic or 
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generic memory). Non-specific memories are classified as either episodic or generic. An episodic 
memory lacks any single-event statements and is less detailed in both content and emotion. 
Furthermore, these memories tend to occur over a larger span of time when compared to specific 
memories. A generic memory is a memory that has occurred over time and is repetitive 
throughout an individual’s life. These reoccurring events blend into one memory (Singer & 
Blagov, 2000-2001).  
Self- Defining Memories and Depression. 
Given the complexity of self-defining memory and the involvement of various brain 
regions and pathways, researchers have examined the effects of depression on self-defining 
memories. Depression has a known effect on memory; in general, it reduces the amount of 
attention and resources that individuals can allocate to their environments (Bolles, 1998). With 
respect to self-defining memory, Conway (1990) hypothesized that depression has a clouding 
effect on self-defining memory, an effect that may act as an adaptive function in order to protect 
an individual from memories, which might exacerbate his or her depressive state (Conway, 
1990). An individual essentially blocks out parts of memories that may be harmful to his or her 
emotional state, as a protective factor.  
With a relationship established between depression and reduced encoding and retrieval of 
memory, researchers examined the effect of depression more specifically on autobiographical 
memories. Moore, Watts, and Williams (1988) suggested that deficits and biases in 
autobiographical memory result from an inability to progress beyond general recall, as a result of 
the effects of depression, to a more specific memory. Interestingly, they found that depressed 
individuals, when asked to recall a specific positive memory, instead responded with a general 
memory, unable to recall a specific memory, even when prompted to do so. This suggests that 
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when attempting to recall a memory, individuals first access general memories and then move to 
specific recall. Barsalou (1988) proposed a similar processing model, in which individuals move 
from general memory to specific memory, a phenomenon termed the hypothesis of event 
organization. When trying to understand an event, the comprehension hypothesis of event 
organization states that generic information concerning the event is first retrieved, which helps to 
establish a basic understanding of what is occurring. If other memories are similar to the one 
currently being analyzed, those memories help create a more accurate inference of the events in 
the original memory. Finally, each memory event is an integration of generic knowledge and the 
specifics concerning the event. It is the comprehension of the event that determines how the 
memory is to be stored and organized in memory. As was suggested by the findings of Moore, 
Watts, and Williams (1988) as well as the hypothesis of event organization, when attempting to 
recall specific memories, the pathology of depression hinders an individual from progressing 
beyond general recall to specific recall. Depression’s clouding effect may prevent full 
comprehension of an event, impacting the storage and organization of memory, and interfering 
with an individual’s ability to recall specific details of an event.  
The inability to progress past general memory to specific memory in individuals 
diagnosed with depression has been demonstrated by multiple researchers. Moffit, Singer, 
Nelligan, Carlson, and Vyse (1994) found that individuals diagnosed with depression struggled 
to retrieve and describe specific positive memories when asked to do so. More specifically, 
depressed individuals recalled more summary-type memories than did a normative population 
when asked to provide a self-defining memory. Moffit et al. suggested that individuals’ inability 
to recall a specific self-defining memory was the due to a lack of specific details to retrieve. 
They proposed that the specific details of the memory had not being encoded in the first place, 
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years earlier. Therefore, these individuals could not retrieve specific cues, as they did not exist, 
preventing an individual with depression from moving from a general recall to a specific 
memory.  
The inability to recall specifics had been demonstrated among clinically depressed 
samples as well. Individuals who had attempted suicide had a harder time recalling positive 
memories compared to the speed at which they were able to recall a negative memory (Williams 
& Broadbent, 1986). These findings are not surprising given that individuals diagnosed with 
emotional disorders are more likely to have memories biased by their current moods, and are 
more likely to recall a negative event faster than a positive event (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Lloyd 
& Lishman, 1975; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). Furthermore, it was found that the individuals 
who overdosed (deemed clinically depressed), accessed nonspecific memories more than specific 
memories for both positive and negative cueing; however, this phenomenon was more strongly 
demonstrated for positive cueing (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Similarly, a meta-analysis 
performed on eleven studies demonstrated a significant difference between depressed individuals 
and controls in their ability to recall non-specific memories and specific memories. The overall 
findings suggested that depressed individuals were significantly more likely to produce a non-
specific memory than the controls, who were more likely to produce a specific memory when 
prompted. Even more convincingly, these researchers discovered a mean Cohen’s d statistic of 
0.94, indicating a very strong effect size (Williams et al., 2007).  
It is clear that depression and autobiographical memory recall are linked, but what is the 
importance of this relationship? One study found that individuals who were depressed and 
provided non-specific memories when prompted, especially for positive memories, were less 
likely to recover from depression and were less responsive to anti-depressant treatment 
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(Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993). These findings suggest that autobiographical 
memory may be valuable in identifying and targeting individuals who, as a result of persistent 
depression are less responsive to pharmacological treatment and are at a greater risk from 
attempting suicide, given that a relationship between suicide attempters and non-specific 
memory recall has been found (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986).  
The Relationship Between Depression and Anxiety. 
Although depression and anxiety are classified as separate disorders, there is some 
overlap between the two disorders in their symptomology, and comorbidity with anxiety and 
mood disorders is high. Some of the overlapping symptoms of depression and anxiety include 
oversensitivity to criticism, self-consciousness, feeling rejected, dysphoria, sleep disturbances, 
appetite disturbances, fatigue, and irritability (Liebowitz, 1993; Zajecka & Ross, 1995). 
According to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5) individuals who meet the criteria for generalized anxiety disorder are likely to have 
met, either currently or previously, the criteria for unipolar depressive disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The DSM-5 suggests that “the neuroticism or emotional liability 
that underpins this pattern of comorbidity is associated with temperamental antecedents and 
genetic and environmental risk factors shared between these disorders” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, p.226). Wetzler and Katx (1989) found that in a review of 17 studies, 10 of 
which pertained to individuals with anxiety and 7 of which pertained to individuals with 
depression, that the other condition existed within patients 50% of the time, suggesting that a 
link may exist between these two disorders. Other research suggests that the comorbidity rates 
between these two disorders may be even higher, with 85% of patients with depression also 
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experiencing symptoms of anxiety and 90% of patients with an anxiety disorder also having 
symptoms of depression (Gorman, 1997). Gorman (1997) also suggests that patients with 
comorbid anxiety and depression do not respond as well to therapy, have longer courses of 
illness, and have less positive treatment outcomes, although selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors seems to be beneficial for these individuals. In reference to the neurological aspects of 
mental disorders, there are implications that corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) plays a role in 
both depressive and anxious symptomology. An increase of CRF neuronal activity has been 
assessed as a state marker for depression and CRF also plays a role in the pathology of anxiety 
disorders as a result of its effect on the central noradrenergic systems (Arborelius, Owens, 
Plotsky & Nemeroof, 1999). Given that anxiety and depression may be the result of similar 
pathophysiology, they may also have a similar effect on the recall of autobiographical memories 
to that of depression.  
Self-Defining Memories and Anxiety.  
 Although not as extensively studied as the impact of depression on self-defining memory 
recall, research has examined the impact of anxiety on self-defining memory recall. Krans, de 
Bree, and Bryant (2014) found that individuals who scored high in social anxiety recalled more 
negative autobiographical memories with a focus on events related to social anxiety. These 
individuals also reported that they had active goals to overcome social anxiety. This is 
meaningful because current goals impact the recall of autobiographical memories according to 
the Self-Memory System model of autobiographical memory. Therefore, the active goal of 
overcoming social anxiety made an individual more likely to recall an autobiographical memory 
with a focus on social anxiety, as this topic was of central interest to the individual.  
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 Sutherland and Bryant (2005) performed a similar study, except individuals were focused 
on overcoming PTSD, not social anxiety. They found that individuals with PTSD reported more 
negative, and fewer positive, self-defining memories than individuals without PTSD. Similarly to 
Krans, de Bree, and Bryant’s (2014) findings, Sutherland and Bryant (2005) found that 
individuals with PTSD reported memories with a focus on trauma. This once again suggests a 
strong influence of current goals on the retrieval process on self-defining memories.  
 Further research suggests there may be a differential impact on autobiographical memory 
based on an individual’s specific psychopathology. Rubin (2005) found that individuals who 
were diagnosed with panic disorder or PTSD had a stronger memory for events involving 
threatening stimuli, but that these findings did not hold true for individuals with generalized 
anxiety disorder and social phobia. Rubin suggested that these findings may be due to the fact 
that autobiographical memories involving events concerning trauma and fear are fundamentally 
different from autobiographical memories involving events concerning social anxiety and 
generalized anxiety (Rubin, 2005). As a result, traumatic experiences would be less likely to be 
recalled by an individual with social anxiety or general anxiety, as trauma is not as central to the 
self as it is in an individual with PTSD or a panic disorder. Rubin (2005) also found that 
memories recalled concerning panic and trauma were more specific than memories concerning 
worry and social phobia. This suggests that panic and trauma have less of a clouding effect on 
recall than does social phobia and worry. 
Although it appears that there have been no studies concerning the effects of anxiety on 
the recall of self-defining memories, research concerning PTSD and social anxiety suggests that 
anxiety does in fact impact recall. However, future research should be conducted in order to 
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conclude whether or not generalized anxiety has the same clouding effect on recall as depression 
does, given their similar psychopathology and past findings.  
Self-Defining Future Projections.  
Understanding how individuals view their future is just as important as understanding 
how an individual recalls his or her past. It has been shown that self-defining memories are 
important to personal identity, but anticipating meaningful events to occur in the future may play 
a similar role in shaping personal identity (Demblon & D’Argembeau, 2016). D’Argembeau, 
Lardi, and Van der Linden (2012) introduced the term “self-defining future projections” to 
describe these predictions about our future. The counterpart to self-defining memories, self-
defining future projections are thought to have the same effect on an individual’s identity as a 
self-defining memory. A self-defining future projection is a mental representation of a realistic, 
but also significant, future event that an individual feels strongly will happen in the future 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2012). These projections can be as simple as imagining yourself as being a 
parent one day, since in the present moment you are relatively certain that this will happen one 
day. Demblon and Argembeau (2016) argued that “in the same way as self-defining memory 
support representations of present and past selves, self-defining projection may ground and 
exemplify people’s conceptions of themselves in the future” (p. 2). Vingoles, Regalia, Manzi, 
Golledge, and Scabini (2006) proposed that there are six identity motives that individuals 
incorporate into their concepts of their own futures. These motives demonstrate an individual’s 
values and how that individual wishes to be in the future. These six motives are: the self-esteem 
motive, the distinctiveness motive, the continuity motive, the meaning motive, the belonging 
motive, and the efficacy motive. As evidenced by their names, these motives were based on 
Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs (Maslow, 1943, 1954). These motives often appear in self-
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defining future projections, as individuals feel that they need them in order to be successful and 
to be happy (Maslow 1943, 1954).  
Researchers have found that when asked to think about future events, individuals 
overestimate the impact that future events will have on their mood, whether the predicted event 
is negative or positive (Wenze, Hunthert, & German, 2012). This phenomenon has been termed 
impact bias (Wenze et al., 2012). In one study, researchers hypothesized that the differences in 
an individual’s ability to incorporate current moods in judgment-making influence likelihood 
estimation. Likelihood estimation is similar to self-defining future projections in that both 
concepts focus on an individual’s prediction of his or her future. These researchers found that 
dysphoric individuals used negative emotion more often in cognition than positive emotion, 
resulting in a pessimistic view of the future. These findings “suggest that dysphoric individuals’ 
tendency not to use positive emotion may be a cognitive mechanism distinguishing depressive 
future-oriented thinking from more general mood effects” (Marroquin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2015, p.130). In another study, researchers found that both depression and anxiety symptoms 
were related to a bias in predicting a negative mood for the future (Wenze et al., 2012). 
Therefore, understanding self-defining future projections and how each individual predicts and 
envisions his or her future is crucial in helping to identify individuals who may be need treatment 
for depression or anxiety. 
The Present Study. 
 The proposed study will further research in the area of self-defining memory, which 
appears to have few recent findings, despite its important implications in the formation of the 
self. This study aims to replicate precious findings, which demonstrate a non-specific recall of 
autobiographical memory, within a non-clinical population with elevated depressive symptoms. 
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The present study elected not to present participants with a positive or negative cue for retrieval. 
Instead, individuals were simply prompted to recall a self-defining memory, as defined by Singer 
and Blagov (2000). The decision to abstain from emotional cueing was in hopes of overcoming 
the difficulty that individuals with depression have in recalling a specific memory of a certain 
valence, given the prior research that suggests that recalling a negative memory is less 
challenging for an individual with depression than a positive memory (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; 
Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Therefore, 
the this study would determine whether or not non-specific recall exists for individuals with 
depression regardless of emotional cueing; they struggle to recall specific memories no matter 
valence. The proposed study will also examine whether anxiety impacts self-defining memory 
recall given the close relationship between anxiety and depressive disorders.  
The proposed study will also address the effects of anxiety and depression on self-
defining future projections. Given the limited previous findings in this area, additional research 
will be able to add to the confidence that depressive symptoms might have a similar detrimental 
effect on future projections (e.g., predicting a more negative future) as it does on recalling past 
memories. Furthermore, few studies concerning future projections have examined the impact of 
anxiety on this cognitive process. Finally, little research has been conducted specifically on the 
valence of future projections among depressed and anxious individuals, more specifically the 
emotional tone of future projections.  
Based on previous research, the proposed study hypothesized that: 1(a) memory type 
(pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and 
generic) is predictive of depression scores on the BDI; 1(b) memory type (pure specific, specific 
with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) is predictive of 
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anxiety scores on the BAI, State form of the STAI, and Trait form of the STAI; 2(a) individuals 
who report greater depressive symptomology will respond to a self-defining memory prompt 
with non-specific responses significantly more than individuals who report less depressive 
symptomology; 2(b) individuals who report higher anxiety symptomology will respond to a self-
defining memory prompt with non-specific responses significantly more than those with lower 
anxiety symptomology; 3(a) Lower valence scores on the self-defining future projection task are 
predictive of depression scores on the BDI; 3(b) Lower valence scores on the self-defining future 
projections task are predictive of anxiety scores on the BAI, State form of the STAI, and Trait 
form of the STAI; 4(a) Shorter lengths of responses on the self-defining future projection task 
are predictive of depression scores on the BDI; 4(b) Shorter lengths of response on the self-
defining future projection task are predictive of anxiety scores on the BAI, State form of the 
STAI, and Trait form of the STAI.  
Method 
Participants 
The participants in this study were 52 undergraduate students enrolled at Union College, 32.7% 
of whom were men and 67.3% of whom were women. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 22 
years (M= 19.5, SD= 0.71) and 73.1% identified as Caucasian/White, 11.5% as Asian, 5.8% as 
African American or Black, and 1.9% as Native American. Participants volunteered to 
participate in the study advertised as “narrative memory and personality” through an online 
psychology participant pool at Union College. Participants either received credit towards a 
psychology course or received $6 monetary compensation in exchange for their participation.  
Materials 
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Demographic Questions. Participants were asked to complete three open-ended 
questions regarding age, race, and gender, in order to determine the demographics of the sample.  
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1961). A shortened version of the Beck 
Depression Inventory, consisting of 20 questions on a Guttman scale ranging from 0-3, was 
administered to participants in order to assess depressive symptoms. Question 9, which asks 
about suicidal thoughts, was removed from the inventory per request of the Human Subjects 
Review Committee. Therefore, the score on each item was summed to create a total score, 
divided by the 20 questions to determine the average, and then multiplied by 21 to determine the 
score for the full measure, with the lowest possible score being 0 and the highest possible being 
63. The higher the score on the measure, the higher the degree of depressive symptomology 
within the individual. The internal consistency of the BDI is reported as being .90, while the 
retest reliability ranges from .73 to .96 (Wang & Gorenstein, 2013). 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Brown, Epstein, & Steer, 1988). The Beck 
Anxiety Inventory, which consists of 21 questions, was administered to participants in order to 
assess anxiety levels. The BAI was designed to better discriminate between anxiety and 
depression, something that other anxiety inventories, including the STAI had not done 
effectively (Beck, Brown, Epstein, & Steer, 1988), with STAI-BDI correlations of .60 reported 
for the State scale and .73 reported for the Trait scale, respectively (Tanaka-Matsumi & 
Kameoka, 1986). Participants were presented with a symptom such as “feeling hot” and were 
asked to indicate how much they have been bothered by that symptom in the past month (0-not 
at all, 1-mildly but it didn’t bother me much, 2- moderately- it wasn’t pleasant at times, 3-
severely-it bothered me a lot). Each item on the BAI was summed in order to determine a total 
score, with a lowest possible score of 0 and a highest possible score of 63. The BAI has an 
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internal consistency of α= .92 in a sample of adults ranging in age from17 to 80 years od and 
test-retest reliability over one week of r(81)=.75 (Beck, Brown, Epstein, & Steer, 1988). 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Speilberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & 
Jacobs, 1983). Forms Y-1 and Y-2, which contain a total of 40 questions, were administered to 
participants in order to determine state and trait levels of anxiety in each individual. The first 20 
questions ask the participant to assess how they are feeling in that moment in order to determine 
the state anxiety score for that individual. Questions 21-40 ask the participant to assess how they 
generally feel in order to determine the trait anxiety score for that individual. Participants are 
presented with a statement and then are asked to select a corresponding score (1- Almost Never, 
2- Sometimes, 3- Often, 4-Almost Never) that they best feel corresponds to how they are feeling 
in that moment or how they feel generally. Scores for each question are summed, with some 
being reversed coded. The higher the score on the STAI, the higher the level of anxiety within 
the individual. Individuals were divided into low and high level groups of anxiety for the state 
and trait forms, separately, based on a median split, as determined by the scores of all the 
participants. Although the STAI has shown some correlation to the BDI (Tanaka-Matsumi & 
Kameoka, 1986), the STAI has strong internal consistency and is useful as it provides both a 
state and trait measure, something that the BAI does not provide. The internal consistency 
coefficients for the STAI ranged from .86 to .95 and coefficients for test-retest reliability over 
two months range from .65 to .75 (Speilberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).  
Self-Defining Memory Task (Singer & Blagov, 2000-2001). The Self-Defining 
Memory Task was administered to participants in an adapted form. Participants were given the 
definition of a self-defining memory as defined by Singer and Blagov and were then asked to 
provide two self-defining memories, as opposed to the ten memories that the full task requires.  
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Self-Defining Future Projection Question. Participants were asked to describe where 
they see themselves in two years from that exact moment. They were instructed to use as much 
time and space as they felt they needed to sufficiently answer the question.  
Classification System and Scoring Manual for Self-defining Autobiographical 
Memories (Singer & Blagov, 2000). The two self-defining memory responses were scored 
using the guidelines set forth by Singer and Blagov in their scoring manual. Self-defining 
memories were categorized as a pure specific memory, a specific memory with generalization, a 
specific memory with multiple single events, an episodic narrative, or a generic narrative. Self-
defining memories were also then more generally classified as either specific or non-specific for 
further analysis.  
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW): Instruction Manual and Affective 
Ratings (Bradley & Lang, 1999). In designing the manual, participants were asked to rank 
words depending on how happy or unhappy they made them feel on a one-to-ten point scale 
represented by facial expressions ranging from a frown to a smile. The scores for each word 
were then averaged in order to determine the average valence for that word. The lower the 
average, the more unhappy the word and the higher the average the happier the word. 
Text Analyzer (Online-Utility.org). An online text analyzer, online-utility.org, was used 
to analyze the word count and word frequency of the self-defining future projection.  
Procedure  
The Human Subjects Review Committee at Union College approved this study. All 
participants completed and signed an informed consent form prior to participating in this study, 
and were debriefed following study completion. All participants were asked to complete an 
electronic narrative writing task that consisted of the Self-Defining Memory Task (Singer & 
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Blagov, 2000-2001). Specifically, participants were presented with the definition of a self-
defining memory and asked to provide two self-defining memories. They were then asked to 
describe where they see themselves two years “from this exact moment” in an effort to see 
whether or not individuals who present with anxiety and/or depression see the future in more 
pessimistic terms when compared to individuals who do not present with anxiety or depression. 
Once individuals completed the narrative writing task they were then asked to complete a 
personality inventory, designed as an online survey. The personality inventory consisted of an 
altered version of the BDI, and full versions of the BAI and STAI. Individuals were fully 
debriefed at the completion of the study and informed that their written responses to the self-
defining future projection prompt would be further analyzed in conjunction by the online-
utility.org, an online text analyzer, as well as the ANEW to determine the average emotional 
valence of the self-defining future projection. At this point participants had the opportunity to 
have their responses and corresponding data destroyed so as to no longer participate in the study; 
none of the individuals opted to withdraw their responses.  
Statistical Analysis 
Self-Defining Memory. Self-defining memory responses were categorized based on the 
Classification System and Scoring Manual for Self-defining Autobiographical Memories as 
either a pure specific memory, a specific memory with generalization, a specific memory with 
multiple single events, an episodic narrative, or a generic narrative. Self-defining memories were 
also then more generally classified as either specific or non-specific for further analysis (Singer 
& Blagov, 2000-2001). The BAI, BDI, the State form of the STAI, and the Trait form of the 
STAI were analyzed separately, due to the nature of their measures, in order to determine 
whether depression and anxiety (general, state, and trait) have an effect on the specificity of self-
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defining memory. A One-way ANOVA was performed in order to determine if there was a 
significant difference between specific or non-specific memory type for depression and anxiety 
scores as determined by the BDI, BAI, and the State and Trait forms of the STAI. For this 
analysis only participants who had responded with two specific or two general memory type 
responses were considered (N=36). Four linear regressions were also performed in order to 
determine if memory type (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple 
single events, episodic, and generic) was predictive of scores on the BDI, BAI, State form of the 
STAI, and Trait form of the STAI. The type I error rate was set at p < .05 to determine whether 
depression or anxiety significantly predicted memory type response.  
Self-Defining Future Projections. Participant’s responses to the self-defining future 
projection task were scored for valence by averaging the valence scores for each word used in 
the response according to the valence scores reported by the ANEW. The BAI, BDI, the State 
form of the STAI, and the Trait form of the STAI were analyzed separately, due to the nature of 
the measures. Eight linear regression analyses were performed in order to determine whether 
valence or length of response for the self-defining future projections was a predictor of scores on 
the BDI, BAI, State form of the STAI, and the Trait form of the STAI.  The type I error rate was 
set at p < .05 to determine whether valence and length of response on the self-defining future 
projections significantly predicted BDI, BAI, and STAI scores. 
Results 
Self-Defining Memory. 
  Inter-rater Reliability. For the responses on the modified Self-Defining Memory Task 
the inter-rater reliability (Intraclass Correlation) was r = .89 (p < .05) for content.  
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Findings. Contrary to what was expected, the One-Way ANOVA failed to detect a 
significant difference between the scores on the BDI, BAI, State form the STAI, and Trait form 
of the STAI for specific and general memory type response on the self-defining memory task. 
However, the five memory types (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with 
multiple single events, episodic, and generic) were predictive of scores on the BDI and the BAI, 
but not the State form of the STAI or the Trait form of the STAI.  The results for analyses are 
reported in Tables 1-5. 
BDI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on the BDI for 
specific and non-specific memory types, F (1,33) = .02, p >.05 The linear regression analysis 
found that memory type (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single 
events, episodic, and generic) significantly predicted BDI scores, F (4, 46) = 2.58, p < .05, with 
an R2 of .183. More specifically, the “specific with multiple single events” memory type was a 
significant predictor of BDI scores (β = .38, p = .01).  
BAI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on the BAI for specific 
and non-specific memory types, F (1,33) =1,23 , p >.05. The linear regression analysis showed 
that memory type (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single 
events, episodic, and generic) significantly predicted BAI scores, F (4, 46) = 3.33, p = .02, with 
an R2 of .224. More specifically, the “specific with multiple single events” memory type (β = 
.471, p = .002) and the episodic memory type (β = .366, p = .015) were significant predictors of 
BAI scores. 
State Form of the STAI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on 
the State form of the STAI for specific and non-specific memory types, F (1,33) = .13, p > .05. A 
linear regression analysis was performed to predict BAI scores based on memory type (pure 
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specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic). 
Results were not statistically significant, F (4, 46) = .592, p > .05, with an R2 of .049.  
Trait Form of the STAI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on 
the Trait form of the STAI for specific and non-specific memory types, F(1,33) =.10, p > .05. A 
linear regression analysis was performed to predict BAI scores based on memory type (pure 
specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic). 
Results were not statistically significant, F (4, 46) = .941, p >.05), with an R2 of .074.  
Self-Defining Future Projection.  
Findings. Contrary to what was expected, valence and length of self-defining future 
projections were not significant predictors of BDI, State form of the STAI, and the Trait form of 
the STAI, in linear regression analyses. However, valence scores, but not length of responses, 
were predictive of scores on the BAI. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables 6-9.   
Discussion 
 In contrast to what was predicted, there was no significant difference the mean scores on 
the BDI, BAI, State form of the STAI, and Trait form of the STAI for specific and general 
memory responses on the self-defining memory task. It was also found that memory type (pure 
specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) 
on the self-defining memory task was not predictive of scores on the State and Trait forms of the 
STAI. However, supporting hypotheses, it was found that memory types (pure specific, specific 
with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) on the self-
defining memory task were predictive of scores on the BDI and BAI. Individuals who had lower 
scores on the BDI and BAI tended to report the specific memory types (pure specific, specific 
with generalization, and specific with multiple single events). In particular, the specific with 
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multiple single events memory type was predictive of lower scores on the BDI and BAI and 
episodic memory type was predictive of elevated scores on the BAI. In other words, individuals 
who are less anxious and depressed tend to respond more often with the specific with multiple 
single events memory type and those who are more anxious tend to respond with the episodic 
memory type, suggesting that memory type may be a predictive factor in determining anxiety 
and depression levels when specific with multiple single events and episodic memory types are 
present. Furthermore, this finding also follows the trend that individuals with higher 
symptomology respond more often with general memory types (episodic) than specific (specific 
with generalization). 
 On the self-defining future memory task, valence and length scores were not predictive 
of scores on the BDI, State form of the STAI and Trait form of the STAI, nor was length of the 
self-defining future projection task predictive of BAI scores. However, negatively valence scores 
on the self-defining future projections task were predictive of higher BAI scores.  
Unlike previous findings that showed an effect of depression on an individual’s ability to 
recall specific memories in a nonclinical population (Moffit, Singer, Nelligan, Carlson, & Vyse, 
1994), this study failed to find an effect of depression on specific and general memory recall. 
However, this study did find that the five memory types (pure specific, specific with 
generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) were predictive of 
scores on the BDI. The failure to replicate previous findings that depression has an effect on 
specific and general memory recall may be a result of the new scoring guidelines. In the past the 
specific with multiple single events was often falsely scored as a non-specific memory type, and 
the increase from two categories (specific and non-specific) to five (pure specific, specific with 
generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) allowed for more 
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accurate scoring of memory types. With a larger number of individuals falling into the specific 
with multiple single events category as opposed to one of the non-specific categories (episodic 
and generic) this study may provide a more accurate representation of the effects of depression 
and anxiety on an individual’s ability to recall specific memories. The average BDI score for the 
present study was M= 7.77, SD= 6.74, well within the range of normal mood changes. 
Furthermore, the median BDI score was 5.25, indicating that 50% of the participants scored in 
normal mood changes range.  
The STAI also produced null results for self-defining memories and self-defining future 
projections. Tanaka-Matsumi and Kameoka (1986) found that the STAI was correlated to the 
BDI (a correlation of .60 for the State scale and .73 for the Trait scale), suggesting that the STAI 
does not measure anxiety symptomology completely independently of depression. A correlation 
between scores on the State and Trait scales of the STAI and the BDI was performed for the 
scores in the present study, and a significant correlation was determined (r= .56, p<.001, for 
state anxiety and r=.80, p<.001 for trait anxiety)  replicating previous findings. Given, the null 
findings on the effect of BDI scores for specific and general memory response on the self-
defining memory task, the failure of valence and length of response on self-defining future 
projections to predict scores on the BDI, and the high correlation between the STAI and the BDI, 
it is not surprising that null results occurred for the STAI as well. Furthermore, the median score 
for the STAI for the state form was 34 and 37 for the trait form. A cut-score of 39 has been 
suggested for the determination of clinically significant symptomology on either form the STAI 
(Julian, 2011). At least 50% of participants did not reach clinical symptomology, resulting in 
range restriction, and therefore there may not have been enough variability between scores to 
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accurately determine the effects of state and trait anxiety on specific and general self-defining 
memories.  
Some of the limitations of the present study include range restriction for the BDI and the 
STAI, which resulted in mean scores that placed individuals within the normative range, with 
few scores in clinically significant ranges. This may have resulted in null results and a failure to 
replicate previous findings that depression was associated with decreased ability to recall specific 
memories. Secondly, the strong correlation between the BDI and the State and Trait forms of the 
STAI suggest that the STAI may have been studying anxiety disorders that had greater overlap 
with depressive symptomology. Therefore, the results concerning the STAI were not 
independently assessing anxiety, but were nevertheless helpful in assessing different forms of 
anxiety, as some anxious individuals exhibit depressive symptomology as well. Future research 
could utilize anxiety measures with minimal correlation to depression that exclude items 
assessing common symptomology, in order to address anxiety disorders that have minimal 
overlap with depressive symptomology. Thirdly, the current sample was a convenience sample 
and may not generalize to the broader population, as the current sample consisted of young 
adults who were predominantly female and predominantly White. Lastly, the small sample size 
of this study resulted in limited statistical power necessary to detect small effect sizes typically 
seen in nonclinical samples, an occurrence that could easily be remedied by replicating this study 
with a larger sample.  
Despite these limitations, the current study had notable strengths. This study was the first 
to examine the effects of anxiety on self-defining memory and found that the type of memory 
response on a self-defining memory task as well as the valence score on a self-defining future 
projection task are predictive of anxiety scores on the BAI. This study was also the first to 
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examine valence and length of self-defining future projections as predictors of depressive and 
anxiety symptomatology. Although valence and length of self-defining future projections was 
not predictive of BDI, and STAI scores, valence was predictive of BAI scores, suggesting the 
importance of examining this relationship in future research.  Lastly, although the STAI 
demonstrated a strong correlation to the BDI, the BAI was designed to study anxiety 
independently of depression, and therefore the significant finding that self-defining memory type 
is predictive of anxiety scores suggests that anxiety, independent of depression, may have an 
effect on memory type retrieval.  
A larger non-clinical sample may improve range and variability amongst scores and 
allow for a more accurate representation of high and low scores on each measure. The failure to 
replicate previous findings of the effects of depression on self-defining memories suggests that 
non-clinical samples of this size may not be suitable for replicating previous findings, as effect 
sizes are likely to be smaller within nonclinical samples than those comparing clinical to 
nonclinical groups. The failure to replicate previous findings also demonstrates that the general 
and specific memory types on the self-defining memory task are not refined as an indicator of 
depression at lower ranges of depressive symptomatology, but is instead better designed to 
identify moderate and more severe levels of depression. However, memory type (pure specific, 
specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) is 
predictive of scores on the BDI and may be useful in determining individuals in need of 
psychiatric intervention. Furthermore, this study determined that anxiety, as measured by the 
BAI, affects an individual’s ability to recall specific memory types, a new finding for self-
defining memory research, and even more importantly found that memory type (pure specific, 
specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) on a self-
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defining memory task is predictive of scores on the BAI. This suggests that anxiety may have the 
same clouding affect in reference to specifics that previous researchers suggested that depression 
has on memory. Just as depression utilizes much of an individual’s cognitive resources, anxiety 
may do the same, reducing the cognitive resources that an individual has to encode and retrieve 
specifics for memory.  
Future research should focus on replicating the previous non-clinical findings of Moffit, 
Singer, Nelligan, Carlson, and Vyse (1994) in larger samples, which would be expected to 
increase variation in scores. Furthermore, research should be done to refine the self-defining 
memory task for children to see if it can be used as an accurate marker for children who are at 
risk for anxiety and depression. This task would be a low-stress activity that could be beneficial 
for identifying children who may require more testing to determine if they meet the diagnostic 
criteria of anxiety and depression. Future research should also examine the effects of anxiety and 
depression on self-defining future projections, as the limited sample in this study may have failed 
to determine an effect that may exist in larger samples with greater variability.  
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Appendix A 
Table 1. One-Way ANOVA (N=36). The Significance Level of the Difference Between Mean 
Scores on the BDI, BAI, State Form of the STAI and Trait Form of the STAI for Specific and 
Non-Specific Memory Types on the Self-Defining Memory Task.  
 F df sig (2-tailed) 
BDI .02 
 
1, 33 .88 
BAI 1.24 1, 33 .27 
State form of the 
STAI 
.13 1, 33 .72 
Trait form of the 
STAI 
.10 1, 33 76 
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Table 2. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining 
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the BDI (N=51).  
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Pure Specific 
-2.07 1.98 -.15 .30 
 
Specific with 
Multiple Single 
Events 
 
 
4.77 
 
1.83 
 
.38 
 
.01* 
 
Episodic 
 
1.70 
 
1.45 
 
.18 
 
.25 
 
Generic 
 
-.80 
 
3.11 
 
-.04 
 
.80 
*Significant Finding 
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Table 3. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining 
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the BAI (N=51).  
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Pure Specific 2.75 2.78 .14 .33 
 
Specific with 
Multiple Single  
Events 
 
8.50 
 
2.57 
 
.47 
 
.002* 
 
Episodic 
 
5.12 
 
2.03 
 
.27 
 
.02* 
 
Generic 
 
5.48 
 
4.36 
 
.17 
 
.22 
*Significant Finding 
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Table 4. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining 
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the State form of the STAI (N=51). 
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Pure Specific -2.32 3.19 -.11 .47 
 
Specific with 
Multiple Single  
Events 
 
1.86 
 
2.95 
 
.10 
 
.53 
 
Episodic 
 
2.26 
 
2.33 
 
.16 
 
.34 
 
Generic 
 
.09 
 
5.01 
 
.00 
 
.99 
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Table 5. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining 
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the Trait form of the STAI (N=51). 
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Pure Specific -1.75 3.55 -.08 .63 
 
Specific with 
Multiple Single  
Events 
 
5.42 
 
3.28 
 
.26 
 
.11 
 
Episodic 
 
1.70 
 
2.60 
 
.10 
 
.52 
 
Generic 
 
-.32 
 
5.58 
 
-.00 
 
.96 
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Table 6. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Valence and Length of Response on the 
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the BDI (N=46). 
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Valence 4.61 2.95 .23 .13 
Length of 
Response 
-.00 .01 -.02 .90 
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Table 7. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Valence and Length of Response on the 
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the BAI (N=46). 
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Valence 9.05 3.82 .34 .02* 
Length of 
Response 
-.03 .02 .28 .06 
*Significant Finding 
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Table 8. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for the Valence and Length of Response on the 
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the State Form of the STAI (N=46). 
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Valence 5.85 4.64 .19 .21 
Length of 
Response 
-.01 .02 -.04 .80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS, MEMORY, AND THE FUTURE 	 42 
Table 9. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for the Valence and Length of Response on the 
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the Trait Form of the STAI (N=46). 
Variable B SE(B) β Sig. 
Valence 5.39 5.27 .15 .31 
Length of 
Response 
-.01 .03 .08 .62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 		
